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ATTRACTING UNDUE SCRUTINY ON APPEAL:  
AN APPELLATE JUDGE’S PERSPECTIVE 
Marshall L. Davidson, III* 
Trial judges have difficult jobs. They must often make on-
the-spot decisions, such as ruling on an objection at trial, with 
little or no time for reflection. They must grapple with zealous 
lawyers while navigating a fine line between ensuring due 
process and fairness to self-represented litigants and maintaining 
neutrality and fairness to the opposing side. As first-line 
decision makers, they must sometimes resolve difficult issues in 
a legal vacuum, as with an issue of first impression. Little about 
the trial judge’s role in the administration of justice is easy.
*After graduating with honors from the University of Tennessee College of Law, where he 
served on the Tennessee Law Review, Judge Davidson worked as a law clerk for the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court. He then spent time in 
private practice handling civil and criminal cases before serving as a Staff Attorney for the 
Tennessee Supreme Court for twenty-two years focusing primarily on civil appeals. He has 
served as a Judge Advocate General Officer in the United States Army Reserve, has taught 
at the collegiate and law school levels for many years, and has authored a number of 
articles published in law reviews and bar journals about appellate litigation and other 
topics. Judge Davidson is a member of the Belmont College of Law American Inn of Court 
and a CASA volunteer working with children who are the subjects of abuse and neglect 
proceedings. In 2014, he was appointed by Governor Haslam to the Tennessee Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board, where he serves as Presiding Judge.
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And, of course, nearly every decision a trial judge makes is 
subject to challenge on appeal by any party who believes the 
decision is wrong. After twenty-five years of reviewing 
thousands of trial and intermediate appellate court decisions for 
error in all types of cases, it is apparent to me there are some 
common ways trial judges attract greater scrutiny on appeal than 
they otherwise might. This essay addresses some of the more 
common ones.
A. USING HUMOR IMPROPERLY
“Humor in the judicial system is not funny.”1 After 
attending national conferences at which judicial writing is 
featured as a prominent topic, I am always struck by the division 
among judges, both state and federal, over whether humor has 
an appropriate place in a court’s written decision. Some judges 
believe, and strenuously assert, that judicial writing is 
unnecessarily dull, uninspiring, and unimaginative.
Consequently, some judges see nothing wrong with injecting a 
bit of levity into an otherwise cold, impersonal, and technical 
way of conducting business. For example, in a case involving 
the issue of whether the defendant, a married man, should be 
placed on probation for attempting to convince a minor to check 
into a hotel with him, the court observed:
This defendant has in the eyes of the law done wrong, but 
not enough in this instance to be jailed, and the least the 
trial judge can do is to relieve him of his temporary 
sentence, and remember that he is forever and eternally on 
probation to his wife, who will be his wife, his warden and 
parole officer all wrapped up in one. What a sad fate for 
any poor mortal to face.2
While it is difficult to know what, if any, reaction the 
defendant, his wife, the prosecutor, or anyone else associated 
with this case had upon reading the court’s decision, it is not far-
fetched to imagine that such commentary in the opinion may 
have been viewed as offensive or even hurtful. Perhaps worse, it 
1. Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion 
Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 271 (2008).
2. State v. Silva, 477 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Tenn. 1972).
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may have been viewed as diminishing the seriousness of the 
crime of which the defendant was convicted.
But some judges are skilled enough to inject humor in such 
a way to avoid giving offense. For instance, in a case about 
fertilizer and tax deductions, a federal court of appeals wrote
that
“[t]o every thing there is a season, and a time to every 
purpose under the heaven: A time to be born, and a time to 
die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is 
planted; a time to purchase fertilizer, and a time to take a 
deduction for that which is purchased.”3
In another case involving the tort principle of attractive 
nuisance, the court declared that
[w]hile we acknowledge the picturesque beauty of the 
rolling hills and majestic mountains of Tennessee and agree 
that they are attractive, the fortunate fact that God has 
strewn His splendor with such a lavish hand and blessed 
our state with great beauty, and has made it a veritable 
playground, hardly affords a reason to classify any normal 
topographical feature as an attractive nuisance.4
It is difficult to imagine a reasonable reader taking offense at 
either of these cleverly written observations.
There is, of course, a self-evident danger in attempting to 
weave humor into judicial writing—the parties, and perhaps a 
reviewing court, may feel that the judge did not take the case 
seriously. Consequently, some legal scholars counsel against 
using humor in judicial writing, given that “[t]he litigant has 
vital interests at stake . . . and the robed buffoon who makes 
merry at his expense should be choked with his own wig.”5
Other commentators assert that “[l]itigants consciously place the 
court in a position of power to resolve controversies; they expect 
to be treated fairly and with dignity,” and then point out that 
“[h]umor can defy both expectations.”6
My own view is that attempts at being cute or humorous in 
a written decision should be avoided for fear of being perceived 
3. Schenk v. Comm’r, 686 F.2d 315, 316 (5th Cir. 1982).
4. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 558 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Tenn. 1977).
5. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE JUDICIAL HUMORIST: A COLLECTION OF JUDICIAL 
OPINIONS AND OTHER FRIVOLITIES vii (1952).
6. Lebovits, Curtin & Solomon, supra note 1, at 272.
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as flippant, uncaring, or unprofessional by the parties, other 
courts (in particular, an appellate court charged with reviewing 
the decision), or the public in general. As stated by the Kansas 
Supreme Court, “[j]udges simply should not ‘wisecrack’ at the 
expense of anyone connected with a judicial proceeding,” for 
“[w]hen judges do this . . . respect for the administration of 
justice suffers.”7 The risk of giving the parties the impression 
that the judge is making light of their situation is just not worth 
it.
B. DISCOUNTING THE LAW
Public confidence in the performance and impartiality of 
the courts is maintained only when judges rigorously follow the 
law. The basic idea, of course, is that judges should interpret 
statutes and other laws as they find them and apply those laws 
faithfully according to their plain meaning. The discretion to 
establish public policy is generally committed to legislative 
bodies, not to the courts. Thus, to avoid reading their own 
beliefs and values into the law, judges are expected to apply the 
law as written. Put another way, it is not the province of the 
judge to second-guess the wisdom of legislation and decide 
cases based on what the judge believes the law should be.8 No
reasonable jurist would seriously contend otherwise.
Similarly, most judges would readily agree that decisional 
inconsistency and unpredictability represent the antithesis of an 
efficient and effective system of resolving disputes. Yet, court 
decisions that fail to faithfully follow the law can create just the 
sort of inconsistency and unpredictability that can undermine the 
7. In re Rome, 542 P.2d 676, 685 (Kan. 1975).
8. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1978) (“Our individual 
appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the 
Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an 
enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to 
an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of 
veto.”). On the other hand, a statute’s meaning can sometimes be less clear than the judge 
would hope, see, e.g., Steven Wisotsky, How to Interpret Statutes—Or Not: Plain Meaning 
and Other Phantoms, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321, 324 (2009) (asserting that 
“superficially clear statutory language may upon concentrated analysis prove ambiguous”
and that “there is no plain meaning without context”), but judges are nonetheless charged 
with determining plain meaning and then applying the law.
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efficiency and effectiveness of our judicial system. The result is 
diminished public confidence in the integrity of the courts.
Accordingly, few things attract the attention of a reviewing 
court more quickly than a lower court’s failure to correctly 
identify and apply settled legal principles. Reviewing courts will 
not fully trust the work of a court with a demonstrated pattern of 
failing to follow the law. Or to put it differently, trial judges 
undermine their credibility with appellate courts by repeatedly 
misstating the law—albeit inadvertently—or by not adhering to 
relevant legal standards. Once a judicial reputation is diminished 
in this regard, it is not easily rehabilitated.
C. MISSTATING KEY FACTS
Trial courts are, of course, primarily fact-finding courts.9
Thus, it is no small matter when a trial court misapprehends or 
misconstrues crucial facts. Appellate judges can readily identify 
trial courts in their jurisdictions that are careful when making 
factual determinations and those that are not. Naturally, 
decisions by judges in the latter category tend to be reviewed, 
consciously or unconsciously, more closely on appeal.
Cases are not decided in a factual vacuum and, generally 
speaking, the law has little meaning outside the factual context 
in which it has been applied. Accordingly, the difficulty 
attendant to a judge’s misapprehension of even one key fact is 
that it can skew the resulting legal analysis. Indeed, such a 
mistake can be outcome determinative. Thus, to state the 
obvious, factual assertions in a court’s decision must be 
completely accurate. Courts, both trial and appellate, take a dim 
view of lawyers who incorrectly present the facts, cite cases that 
have little to do with the proposition for which they are cited, 
take testimony out of context, or exaggerate the proof. The same 
applies to judges.
In short, carelessness with the facts will attract the attention 
of a higher court. A judge’s credibility and reputation are hard-
9. See, e.g., DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 (1974) (acknowledging that 
when a “factual issue was dispositive of the case . . . , it would have been better practice 
not to resolve it in the Court of Appeals based only on the materials then before the court”
and that “[t]he issue should have been remanded for initial disposition in the District Court 
after an evidentiary hearing”).
39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 6 Side B      05/10/2017   10:58:23
39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 6 Side B      05/10/2017   10:58:23
DAVIDSONEXECEDIT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2017 6:12 PM
182 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
earned assets, and misstating the essential facts of the case or the 
law, even if unintentional, undermines both. To avoid this 
pitfall, judges, regardless of court, must be meticulously 
accurate in describing the factual record. As one trial judge 
observed when considering the lapses in professional conduct of 
an attorney appearing before him, a reputation “for intellectual 
and ethical integrity” is either the “greatest asset” or “worst 
enemy” of anyone working in the law, so the judge
recommended “treat[ing] . . . every daily task as if your career 
will be judged on it.”10 That standard rings as true for the 
members of the trial and appellate benches as for the members 
of the bar.
D. STRAYING BEYOND THE RECORD
From the perspective of an appellate court, evaluating a 
trial court’s decision necessarily entails taking into account 
information the trial court had before it at the time the issues 
were decided, as opposed to the potentially open-ended universe 
of information that parties may seek to present on appeal. The 
same principle applies to the work of a trial judge. That is, trial 
judges should base their decisions on evidence adduced by the 
parties, as opposed to formulating a decision based, in whole or 
in part, on information that they obtain independently. As noted 
by one court,
appellate courts are put in an awkward position . . . [when] 
evidence obtained through private inquiry or observation, 
as well as its probative value, is not shown in the record, 
making an evaluation of the information on appeal difficult, 
if not impossible.11
Moreover, aside from practical problems associated with 
appellate review, trial judges unnecessarily create problems for 
the parties when they consider extrajudicial observations or the 
perspectives of outside individuals. For example, by observing a 
party outside of the proceeding and then considering those 
observations in the decisionmaking process, the judge 
essentially becomes a source of evidence. Although judges can 
10. In re Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (citation omitted).
11. Vaughn v. Shelby Williams of Tenn., Inc., 813 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tenn. 1991).
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generally take judicial notice of the law and certain types of 
facts, a judge presiding over a trial cannot serve as a witness—
and for good reason. The most “obvious one is that the system 
of justice does not appear to be impartial if the judge charged 
with the duty of adjudicating the litigation also acts as a source 
of evidence.”12
To be sure, straying beyond the record will attract attention 
on appeal.
E. USING TONE IMPROPERLY
Just as the tone of the judge’s voice creates an impression 
with the listener, so the tone of the judge’s writing creates an 
impression with the reader. Tone is an important element of 
judicial writing, and a variety of tones are possible in a written 
decision, such as casual, matter-of-fact, angry, annoyed, 
authoritative, impersonal, argumentative, and lecturing. Judicial 
writing is, of course, formal writing, and the tone of the decision 
should reflect the serious responsibility the judge has assumed 
as the adjudicator. Generally, the shorter the sentence the more 
formal the tone, as shorter sentences have a more blunt, 
business-like effect. Longer sentences tend to convey a less 
formal tone.
Along these same lines, condescending, sarcastic, insulting, 
or angry words should be avoided in orders and opinions.
Temper tantrums on paper come across as unprofessional and 
petty. It is one thing to reject a party’s argument as 
“unpersuasive” or “lacking merit,” but another to characterize a 
party’s position as “utterly unconvincing, if not absurd.” Words 
can and do sting. And if they are written words, they can endure 
for the ages and be seen by untold numbers of people, without 
regard to jurisdiction or geography.
The same cautionary note applies to a judge’s oral 
comments. The United States Supreme Court has observed that
judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical 
or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, 
or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality 
challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that 
12. Id.
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derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if 
they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism 
as to make fair judgment impossible.13
Generally, a measured tone is easier to achieve, both orally and 
in writing, when the judge remains focused on the facts and the 
law rather than the judge’s feelings about the parties or their 
conduct, a task sometimes made difficult by the egregious nature 
of certain types of conduct.
Similarly, nothing good comes from taking cheap shots at 
the parties or their lawyers, as these reflect poorly on the writer 
and demean the courts. For example, a federal district court 
judge wrote about
two extremely likable lawyers, who have together delivered 
some of the most amateurish pleadings ever . . . , an effort 
which leads the Court to surmise but one plausible 
explanation. Both attorneys have obviously entered into a 
secret pact—complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic 
words—to draft their pleadings entirely in crayon on the 
back sides of gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope 
that the Court would be so charmed by their child-like 
efforts that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their 
briefing would go unnoticed.14
The judge further observed that one of the lawyers “has been 
writing crisply in ink since the second grade,” and suggested 
that the “lovable” attorney on the other side “upgrade to a nice 
shiny No. 2 pencil or at least sharpen what’s left of the stubs of 
his crayons for what remains of this heart-stopping, spine-
tingling action.”15 However, the latter attorney was cautioned by 
the judge “not to run with a sharpened writing utensil in hand.”16
While the judge in this case may have had ample reason to be 
unimpressed with counsels’ efforts, an alternative approach to 
the problem would, I believe, have reflected more favorably on 
the individual judge and the judicial system as a whole.
A simple way of avoiding the perception of bias or 
disparagement is to use objective language whenever possible.
For example, do not write “Mr. Smith is a deadbeat dad because 
13. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (emphasis in original).
14. Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 668, 670 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
15. Id. at 672.
16. Id. at 672 n.4.
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he has not paid child support in five years.” Instead, write “Mr. 
Smith has not paid child support in five years.” Do not write 
“Ms. Jones is a terrible driver because she has had three 
accidents in three years.” Instead, write “Ms. Jones has been in 
three accidents in the past three years.” If the objective 
statement is true, the same message will be conveyed without 
resorting to what might be viewed as inflammatory language.
Admittedly, this type of restraint is not always easy to muster,
but judges are expected to act with restraint nonetheless.
F. LOSING JUDICIAL BEARING OR DEMEANOR
Judges are human and, like anyone else, can be prone to 
impatience, annoyance, dissatisfaction, and anger. But unlike 
other people, judges are legally and ethically required to “act at 
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”17 As stated by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court,
[i]nevitably, members of the public will, from time to time, 
disagree with decisions of our courts, but that disagreement 
should never rest upon lack of confidence in the court’s 
integrity. Public confidence in the integrity of the judicial 
system is essential. It is our responsibility, and the 
responsibility of every judge, to merit and maintain that 
confidence.18
This too is often easier said than done.
Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
some litigants are “thoroughly reprehensible” individuals toward 
whom the trial judge might understandably “be exceedingly ill 
disposed.”19 And, although the overwhelming majority of 
attorneys conduct themselves with civility and strive to adhere 
to the highest of ethical standards, some have difficulty 
maintaining the appropriate decorum, making it harder for the 
judge to remain dispassionate. One lawyer, for example, refused 
to stop talking after being warned by the judge that he would be 
jailed if he continued to speak. He refused to be silent, went to 
17. In re Bell, 344 S.W.3d 304, 319 (Tenn. 2011) (citation omitted).
18. In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings against Aulik, 429 N.W.2d 759, 768 (Wis. 
1988).
19. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 550–51.
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jail, and saw his law license suspended.20 Another lawyer sent 
an email to a judge telling the judge to “get down off your high 
horse and act like a man instead of a bully and clown.”21 Such 
behavior can try the patience of the most temperate of judges.
Judges do not expect to be treated like royalty, nor should 
they. However, they do expect to be treated with respect, and 
rightly so. But the reverse is true as well. When judges, either 
trial or appellate, treat parties or their lawyers with anything less 
than respect, it reflects poorly on both the individual judge and 
the judicial system as a whole.
G. USING EXTREME LANGUAGE
A less conspicuous way trial judges may draw attention on 
appeal is by frequently using extreme or exaggerated words, 
such as “obviously,” “clearly,” “always,” or “never.” I once 
reviewed a trial judge’s decision containing a lengthy 
description of the facts and, at the end of that discussion, the 
judge concluded that those facts “clearly and unmistakably” led 
to a particular result. The result, however, was anything but 
clear and unmistakable to me.
Perhaps there is a streak of contrariness in human nature 
that urges us to reject absolute assertions. Whether or not that is 
so, I have found that when a party or a judge writes that 
something is obvious or clear, the point is sometimes anything 
but obvious or clear. Indeed, such words often go hand in hand 
with weak or unreasonable arguments. While I am not 
suggesting that absolute language has no place in drafting a 
decision, I am suggesting that such words be used with care.
Absolute language naturally draws the reader’s attention, 
some of whom may be quick to question the accuracy of the 
20. See Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 812–13 (suspending license); U.S. v. Moncier, 571 
F.3d 593, 598 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The Court: ‘Mr. Moncier, one more word and you’re 
going to jail.’ Moncier: ‘May I speak to my—’ The Court: ‘Officers, take him into custody. 
We’ll be in recess.’”); see also Moncier v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 406 S.W.3d 139
(Tenn. 2013) (denying petition for relief from payment of costs imposed by disciplinary 
order).
21. Hancock v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 447 S.W.3d 844, 848,
858 (Tenn. 2014) (reprinting screen shot of email message from lawyer to judge and 
affirming thirty-day suspension from practice).
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assertion. How often can it realistically be said that something is 
always true or never the case?
H. LETTING DOWN YOUR GUARD WHILE ON THE RECORD
For most trial judges, being recorded either by a court 
reporter or by some other means is a routine matter. And therein 
lies the problem—forgetting there is a recorder, whether human 
or electronic, in the room.
While working as a staff attorney for the Tennessee 
Supreme Court, I once reviewed a trial transcript in a hotly 
contested appeal. Although subtleties like tone and mood can be 
difficult to gauge from a cold record, it was apparent in this 
instance that the trial judge was losing patience with an 
aggressive lawyer and vice versa. At one point, after the lawyer 
made an impertinent comment following the judge’s overruling 
one of his many objections, the exasperated trial judge said, 
“I’ve ruled on your objection and, if you think I’m wrong, 
appeal to the Supreme Court and let those sons-of-b****** in 
Nashville tell me I’m wrong.”22 The lawyer happily obliged.
Failing to exercise appropriate discretion while on the 
record will not go unnoticed on appeal, even if the appellate 
court does not mention the lapse in its opinion.
I. FAILING TO DECIDE A POTENTIALLY DISPOSITIVE ISSUE
Most judges prefer reaching the merits of a case to 
disposing of the dispute on a technicality or procedural point.
The parties have, after all, turned to the legal system for help in 
resolving a problem that they cannot resolve themselves, and a 
decision short of the merits frustrates those expectations. Thus, 
so-called threshold issues may be viewed by some as obstacles 
to avoid. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, the law itself stresses the 
resolution of cases on the merits.23
22. Because I no longer have ready access to the transcript, I am relying on my 
memory of the exchange. This may not be an exact rendering of the judge’s statement, but 
it is close and conveys essentially what was in the transcript.
23. See, e.g., Henley v. Cobb, 916 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Tenn.1996) (noting that “[i]t is 
well settled that Tennessee law strongly favors the resolution of all disputes on their 
merits” (citations omitted)).
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However, many threshold issues, such as personal 
jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, notice, or the timeliness 
of a claim or defense, can be dispositive of the case. Thus, as 
well-intentioned as the trial judge may be in reaching the merits, 
the failure to address such threshold issues can make quick work 
of the matter on appeal. Indeed, appeals of this type can all but 
invite a remand.
J. MAKING THE SIMPLE DIFFICULT
Making the simple difficult is poor judging. The parties are 
already in a quandary regarding their dispute, and having the 
courts unnecessarily add another layer of difficulty serves to 
further frustrate and confuse matters.
Conversely, making the difficult simple is excellent 
judging. This can be no small task given the complexity of some 
areas of the law. The principles discussed above, such as 
avoiding flippancy or exaggerations and placing a premium on 
precision, brevity, and clarity, can help. So can maintaining a 
demeanor commensurate with the gravity of the proceeding and 
never losing one’s temper. Here are some additional guidelines 
to consider:
x Dispatch weak or unreasonable arguments quickly 
and definitively. As one court has observed, “[i]t is 
not the role of the courts . . . to construct a litigant’s
case.”24 If a party’s evidence is—or arguments
are—too weak to carry the day, unambiguously 
make that point.
x If the parties have filed a statement of the evidence 
in lieu of a transcript, make certain that it is both 
accurate and complete because the appellate judges 
will use it as the factual lens through which the 
decision below is evaluated.
24. Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 
(Tenn. 2010).
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x Although of course it is not a brief, a trial court’s
written decision is meant to be persuasive, and the 
art of persuasion favors quality, not quantity. The 
longer the decision, the more unfocused and diluted 
it may become, and the less certain the case may 
seem to the appellate judges.
x There are two ways lawyers destroy their credibility 
in their briefs. The first is to cite a case for a 
proposition of law for which it does not stand.  The 
second is to make a factual assertion unsupported 
by the record. The same goes for judges in their 
decisions.
x Fully develop the basis for the decision, leaving no 
gaps in the analysis for the appellate judges to fall 
through. Just as lawyers are expected to blend the 
law with the facts in their briefs, judges should do 
the same in their decisions. Being too conclusory is 
a common problem, placing the appellate judges in 
the difficult position of having to infer the rationale 
for the decision.
x Unlike oral arguments that can jump around from 
topic to topic in disjointed fashion, the trial court’s
written decision should lay out a comprehensive 
analysis of the issues so that the appellate judges 
can follow your thinking, especially in factually or 
legally complex or novel cases.
x Be sure the decision is anchored in the law or the 
appellate judges may send it back to you. Ask 
yourself whether your decision leaves any issues 
unresolved and explain why if so. Otherwise, the 
appellate judges may think you overlooked them 
and remand the case.
x Do not ignore adverse authority. Confront it. If the 
authority is not distinguishable and is otherwise 
39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 10 Side B      05/10/2017   10:58:23
39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 10 Side B      05/10/2017   10:58:23
DAVIDSONEXECEDIT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2017 6:12 PM
190 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
binding, follow it. If you don’t, the case may come 
back to you.
x Be cautious when copying and pasting from prior 
decisions, making sure to update the research to 
reflect any new developments. Imagine learning 
from a higher court that a key case you relied upon 
was overruled before your decision was released.
x Make sure that your decision has a logical flow. If 
sentences and paragraphs are inserted where they 
interrupt a line of thought, or where they have no 
connection to what precedes or follows, coherence 
is lost. When this happens, the appellate judges may 
have trouble following your analysis. Transitional 
words at the beginnings of paragraphs help 
appellate judges string your thoughts together and 
frame their own analysis of the case.
x Use headings and subheadings to identify where 
treatment of one subject ends and another begins.
Use long sentences and long paragraphs sparingly, 
as too much information may bog readers down and 
make it harder for them to follow your analysis.
x Edit carefully. Proofread, revise, and use great care 
in editing, checking citations, verifying quotations, 
and polishing your wording for maximum 
effectiveness. Readers may equate sloppy editing 
with sloppy research and analysis.
K. OVERREACTING TO REVERSALS, MODIFICATIONS,
OR REMANDS
Do not take a reversal, a modification, or a remand
personally. I have never met a judge or justice who served on 
the bench for any appreciable length of time who had never been 
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reversed.25 Nearly every judge has a higher court looking over 
his or her shoulder, so a reversal should be expected from time 
to time.26 Occasional disagreement is simply the nature of a 
tiered system of legal decisionmaking. Indeed, if appellate 
courts never reversed lower courts, something would be amiss.
Thick judicial skin comes with time on the bench. But new 
to the bench or not, trial judges would be well-advised to take 
the information before them, make the best decision possible, 
and then forget about it. If an appeal follows and the appellate 
court reverses or modifies the decision, taking it personally can 
become an unnecessary source of frustration and second-
guessing. Be careful not to repeat the same mistake, but move 
on. A pattern of reversals is, of course, a different matter 
altogether—one beyond the scope of this essay.
25. The Fourth Circuit even reversed the decision in a case in which then-Associate 
Justice Rehnquist sat as the trial judge. Heislup v. Town of Colonial Beach, 813 F.2d 401 
(4th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (tbl.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987). Readers interested in 
learning a little more about Justice Rehnquist’s appearance on the federal trial bench can 
consult David G. Leitch, An Unwavering Man and Judge, 10 TEX. J. L. & POLITICS 293, 
293–94 (2005).
26. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[R]eversal 
by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. . . . We are not final 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).
